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CASE NOTE
Tort Law-TOWARDS A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE SUCCESSOR
PRODUCTS LIABILITY DILEMMA-Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438
N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989)
In Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., I the Minnesota Supreme Court was
faced with a head-on collision between traditional principles of cor-
porate law and strict products liability. The issue was whether an
injured plaintiff, who was otherwise without a remedy, should be al-
lowed to recover against a corporate successor which had neither
manufactured the injury-causing product nor introduced it into the
stream of commerce.
In a decision with far-reaching implications for business and prod-
uct liability plaintiffs, the supreme court in Niccum declined to ex-
pand the "mere continuation" exception to successor corporate
liability and rejected the controversial "product line" theory as a rad-
ical departure from the principles of corporate law.2 Further, the
court held that a successor corporation has no independent duty to
warn of harms allegedly caused by defects in a predecessor's
product.3
This Case Note maintains that the court reached the only decision
it could under the Minnesota Business Corporations Act (MBCA).
But because the decision produces harsh results for product liability
plaintiffs, the author concludes that the legislature should modify the
MBCA so as to provide such plaintiffs with a limited, yet needed
remedy..
HISTORY OF THE LAW INVOLVED
In resolving the issue of strict liability for successor corporations,
most courts have applied corporate as opposed to tort law princi-
ples.4 Under corporate law, "[tihe traditional .. .rule is that the
acquiring corporation ('the successor') is not liable for the debts and
1. 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989).
2. Id. at 99, 100.
3. Id. at 101.
4. Sell, Successor Corporation's Liability for Defective Products of Its Transferor-The
Product Line Exception, 4 J.L. & COM. 65, 66 (1984); see also Annotation, Successor Prod-
ucts Liability: Form of Business Organization of Successor or Predecessor as Affecting Successor
Liability, 32 A.L.R.4th 196, 197 (1985).
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liabilities of the acquired corporation ('the predecessor')."5 How-
ever, successor liability may vary depending upon the type of corpo-
rate acquisition involved.6
There are four widely recognized exceptions to the traditional cor-
porate law rule. The exceptions include: 1) the purchaser expressly
or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; 2) the transaction amounts
to a consolidation or merger of the corporation; 3) the purchasing
corporation is "merely a continuation" of the selling corporation; or
4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape
liability.7
5. Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677
(1983). The traditional test developed within the context of corporate, contract and
property law. It provided a balanced means of facilitating corporate acquisitions and
promoting the transferability of capital while protecting the interests of commercial
creditors. By protecting both the creditors of the predecessor and protecting the
successor from unknown or contingent liability, the rule offered fair and equitable
treatment to parties involved in corporate acquisitions. Id. at 683.
For additional background on the rationale for the traditional rule, see Com-
ment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's Liability for Its Predecessor's Defective Prod-
ucts when the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815,
821 (1988); Comment, Choice-of-Law in Minnesota Corporate Successor Products Liability:
Which Rule Is the "Better Rule"?, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 376 (1985).
6. See 2 B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS §§ 23.01-.04
(1986). There are three major types of corporate acquisition: 1) statutory merger or
consolidation; 2) purchase of the acquired corporation's stock; and 3) cash purchase
of the acquired corporation's assets. Id.; see also 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7041, 7118, 7121 (rev. perm. ed. 1983). If the
corporate acquisition is the result of a statutory merger or consolidation, the surviv-
ing corporation will usually be held to have assumed the liabilities of its predecessor,
which ceases to exist. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra, at § 7121.
If the corporate acquisition is through a cash purchase of the acquired corpora-
tion's stock, the acquiring corporation does not "directly" assume the liabilities of
the acquired corporation. See Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: Nature and Scope
of Successor Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
185, 213-14 (1984).
As Yamin indicates, however, there is an indirect assumption of liability because
the acquired corporation is still in existence and subject to liability. Id. Because the
acquired corporation remains a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation with its own
legal identity, it remains subject to suit. Thus, the sale of the predecessor's stock has
no real effect on a product liability plaintiff's ability to sue the acquired corporation.
Id. at 214.
If the corporate acquisition is through a cash purchase of the acquired corpora-
tion's assets, the general rule is that the successor corporation does not assume the
present or contingent liabilities of the predecessor. For a complete collection of
cases invoking this rule, see 15 W. FLETCHER, supra, at § 7122 n. 1. As will be seen, it
is this general rule which the mere continuation and product line exceptions seek to
modify. (Niccum involved a cash purchase of the Wisconsin Equipment Corporation's
assets by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Hydra Tool Corporation.)
7. For a list of cases applying individual exceptions, see Recent Developments,
Torts-Products Liability-Successor Corporation Strictly Liable for Defective Products Manufac-
tured by the Predecessor Corporation-Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. (N.J. 1981), 27
[Vol. 16
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The traditional rule was developed prior to the advent of modem
products liability law.8 As a result, it fails to consider the interests of
consumers injured by defective corporate products.9 Consequently,
the rule's emphasis on successor non-liability contradicts strict liabil-
ity theory which favors shifting the costs associated with defective
products from injured consumers to manufacturers.10
VILL. L. REV. 411, 413-15 (1981-82). Courts have narrowly construed these
exceptions.
8. Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's Liability for Its Predecessor's
Defective Products when the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ.
L. REV. 815, 822 (1988).
9. Id. at 815. In particular, the traditional corporate law rule poses problems
for products liability plaintiffs seeking compensation for their injuries. A plaintiff
may be left without a remedy if the predecessor corporation has dissolved and no
recovery is possible against the successor corporation.
10. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963) remains the best formulation of strict products liability theory. Jus-
tice Traynor stated in Greenman:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the mar-
ket, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
... [T]he refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its
own responsibility for defective products.. . [makes it] clear that the liability
is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort.
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
"The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend
upon the intricacies of the law of sales."
Id. at 62-64, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01 (1963) (citations omitted)
(emphasis supplied).
In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,. 150 P.2d 436 (1944), and
later in Greenman, Justice Traynor addressed the reasons for imposing strict products
liability on manufacturers. The first reason is that manufacturers are better able to
anticipate and protect themselves against product defects than consumers because
manufacturers can purchase insurance and spread the cost to the public in the form
of higher prices. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., con-
curring). The second reason emphasizes the manufacturer's causal role in causing
the injury by virtue of having placed the product in the stream of commerce. Id. at
462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). The third reason protects consumer
expectations based on their reliance on the manufacturer's express or implied repre-
sentations regarding product quality. Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., con-
curring).
The Restatement formulation largely follows the reasons enunciated by Justice
Traynor for imposing strict products liability on manufacturers. Section 402A of the
Restatement provides as follows:
§ 402A. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR PHYSI-
CAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
1990]
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To overcome this problem, plaintiffs have sought to expand the
"mere continuation" exception, as well as add an additional "prod-
uct line" exception to those discussed above."t
THE MERE CONTINUATION EXCEPrION
Products liability plaintiffs have urged the courts to expand the
mere continuation exception to focus more on the continuity of the
business operation than on the existence of a particular corporate
entity.12 Although the Michigan Supreme Court adopted this ap-
proach in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 13 it remains the only state
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966).
For additional information on the development of products liability theory, see
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984).
11. See Comment, supra note 8, at 815.
12. This is diametrically opposed to the traditional corporate law origins of the
exception which emphasize the continuity of the corporate entity rather than its busi-
ness operations. See Sell, supra note 4, at 68. Proponents of expanding the mere
continuation exception argue that the traditional approach within a products liability
context places unwarranted emphasis on the form of a particular corporate transac-
tion which, to the consumer, is largely irrelevant. Id. at 76-78. "[T]he new corporate
entity is literally a mere continuation of the old as far as the consumer is concerned.
The consumer had no control over the corporate structure/ownership charge [sic],
and ought not be penalized because of it." Appellant's Brief at 11, Niccum v. Hydra
Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989). "Thus, by virtue of the formalities of
corporate transfer and the quirks of corporate law, all liability for product defects [is
contracted away. The protection of the consumer, the very heart of product liability
law, [i]s effectively eliminated." Id. at 11.
13. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). Turner expanded the mere continua-
tion exception, holding that successor liability will follow "where the totality of the
transaction demonstrates a basic continuity of the enterprise." Id. at 429-30, 244
N.W.2d at 883-84. Turner is unique because, contrary to the general rule, it held a
successor corporation liable for its predecessor's defective product even though the
successor purchased the predecessor's assets for cash.
Under the continuity of enterprise rule adopted in Turner, the following four
factors make out a prima facie case of successor liability:
1) There was a basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation,
including, apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general busi-
ness operations, and even the [predecessor's] name.
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated,
[Vol. 16
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to have done so.1
4
THE PRODUCT LINE EXCEPTION
The California Supreme Court adopted the product line exception
in Ray v. Alad Corp.'5 Under this theory, a successor corporation
which continues to manufacture a predecessor's product line "as-
sumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line
and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received from the
buying corporation.
3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obligations of
the seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the normal busi-
ness operations of the seller corporation.
4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation.
Id.; see also Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hamp-
shire law).
14. Eight states-Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin-have all declined to expand the mere continuation
exception. See Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.
1988) (court declining to expand mere continuation exception because company did
not purchase all of acquired company's assets, employees were retained under new
employment contracts, and no common identity was found to exist between the two
companies); Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145, 147 (6th Cir.
1987) (although Kentucky has adopted statutory products liability, court found that
the courts in Kentucky have not adopted the "complete line of production" rule);
Jones v..Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 729, 320 N.W.2d 481,484 (1982)
(court declined to expand traditional rule, holding that the question of whether strict
liability in tort should be altered is a question for the legislature); Schumacher v.
Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 245, 451 N.E.2d 195, 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437,
440 (1983) (in order to have "mere continuation" the predecessor company must be
extinguished, but in this case the predecessor had survived); Downtowner, Inc. v.
Acrometal Products, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 122 (N.D. 1984) (court found that mere
continuation rule would serve to frustrate the policies behind strict products liability
theory); Hamaker v. Kenwel-j:Ackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 519 (S.D. 1986)
(The court declined to expand the mere continuation exception where corporate of-
ficers were not the same, where there was an express contract not to assume any of
the predecessor's liabilities, and where the defective product was not manufactured
or sold by the successor corporation. The court held that the mere cash purchase of
a predecessor corporation does not constitute a continuation by the successor.); Os-
trowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 308, 479 A.2d 126, 127 (1984) (court
declined to expand mere continuation exception because it represents a threat to
small businesses); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 312, 376 N.W.2d
820, 829 (1985) (court declined to expand mere continuation exception, finding that
such changes should be made by the legislature).
15. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). In Ray, the California
Supreme Court gave a three-point rationale for its ruling: (1) the plaintiff's lack of
remedy against the original manufacturer; (2) the successor's ability to assume the
predecessor's risk spreading role by means of insurance and increasing product
costs; and (3) essential fairness in requiring a successor who benefits from a prede-
cessor's goodwill to bear the predecessor's products liability costs. Id. at 31, 560
P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
1990]
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.... 16 While New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Washington have also
adopted the product line exception,17 many other states have not.1 8
MINNESOTA LAW
Minnesota follows the traditional corporate law rule of successor
non-liability. In JF. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 19 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that there is no corporate successor liability
where one corporation sells or transfers its assets to another corpo-
ration unless one of the four traditional exceptions applies.20 The
16. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
17. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 347-49, 431 A.2d 811, 819
(1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 23, 434 A.2d 106, 110
(1981); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 599, 689 P.2d 368, 388
(1984).
18. See, e.g., Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145, 147-48 (6th
Cir. 1987) (plaintiff injured while attempting to operate a "Fales" industrial
machine); Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 991-92 (D. Md. 1988)
(plaintiff lost eye while maneuvering folding attic stairway purchased from defend-
ant); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982) (plaintiff injured by
lawn mower manufactured by predecessor corporation of defendant); Gonzalez v.
Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 117 Il1. App. 3d 435, 440, 453 N.E.2d 792, 796
(1983) (fingers on plaintiff's right hand severed by a battline insulation processing
and cutting machine manufactured by a predecessor corporation and owned by its
successor); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Iowa 1987) (executor
of decedent's estate sought compensatory damages for fatal injuries allegedly caused
when using a defective hoist); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343,
356, 314 N.W.2d 614, 619-20 (1981) (plaintiff injured in 1977 while operating a
broaching machine manufactured in 1943 by defendant's predecessor corporation);
Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927, 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (plain-
tiff's right arm amputated at elbow when mechanical press allegedly malfunctioned);
Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 729-30, 320 N.W.2d 481, 484
(1982) (plaintiff lost several fingers when hand caught in punch press); Simoneau v.
South Bend Lathe, Inc., 130 N.H. 466, 470, 543 A.2d 407, 409 (1988) (plaintiff in-
jured in 1985 while operating a punch press manufactured in 1948 by defendant's
predecessor corporation); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347
N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1984) (fire damage to business property allegedly caused by
heater); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d 60, 66-67, 507
N.E.2d 331, 337 (1987) (plaintiff injured by an eight-spindle Conomatic screw
machine); Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953, 954 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiff
working at oil-well site allegedly injured by malfunction in a water brake); Hamaker v.
Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 519-21 (S.D. 1986) (plaintiff's second,
third, fourth, and fifth fingers on left hand severed when caught in notcher machine);
Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(plaintiff injured by product manufactured by dissolved corporation), writ of error re-
fused, 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 308,
479 A.2d 126, 127 (1984) (plaintiff suffered amputation of three fingers and other
injuries while operating press-brake); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293,
309-10, 376 N.W.2d 820, 828 (1985) (plaintiff severely injured while operating
power press machine).
19. 296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W.2d 365 (1973).
20. Id. at 40-41, 206 N.W.2d at 370. JF. Anderson states that:
(Vol. 16
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court's decision inj.F. Anderson was buttressed by the state legisla-
ture in 1981 through the passage of the Minnesota Business Corpo-
rations Act.21 The MBCA provides:
The transferee is liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of
the transferor only to the extent provided in the contract or agree-
ment between the transferee and transferor or to the extent pro-
vided by this chapter or other statutes of this state. 22
The reporter's notes to this section clearly indicate that the legisla-
tion was intended to minimize transferee "exposure to product lia-
bility claims for items manufactured by the transferor."23
Because J.F. Anderson concerned a mechanics lien rather than a
products liability claim, Minnesota courts did not officially rule on
the mere continuation exception within a products liability context
until 1988. In that year, a Minnesota federal district court in Everest
v. American Transportation Corp.24 explicitly declined to extend the
mere continuation exception, noting that "Minnesota courts have in-
dicated that theJ.F. Anderson standard also applies to product liability
claims."25
The Minnesota Court of Appeals first encountered the product
line exception in Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co. 26 However, Standal did
not determine whether the product-line rule would be adopted in
Minnesota. Instead, the court merely followed a straight choice of
law analysis holding a successor corporation liable under Penn-
where one corporation transfers its assets to another corporation, absent
consolidation, merger, or a mere continuation of the selling corporation
such as a reorganization, the receiving corporation is not responsible for the
debts of the transferring corporation except (a) where the purchaser agrees,
expressly or impliedly, to assume such debts, or (b) the transfer of assets is
entered into for inadequate consideration, or otherwise fraudulently, in or-
der to escape liability for such debts.
Id. The traditional test first formulated injF. Anderson has been consistently followed
by Minnesota courts. See, e.g., Everest v. American Transp. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 203,
207 (D. Minn. 1988); State Bank of Young Am. v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292
N.W.2d 244, 251 (Minn. 1980); Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co., 356 N.W.2d 380,
382 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
21. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.001-.917 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
22. MINN. STAT. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (1988).
23. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (West 1985) (Reporter's Notes). The
comment of the Reporter to the Advisory Task Force on Corporation Law states:
Subdivision 4 of this section is aimed at limiting the civil liabilities of trans-
ferors assumed by transferees to those agreed to between the parties or im-
posed by law, even if the transferee is operating the corporation in exactly
the same manner as it was operated by the transferor. This limits, for exam-
ple, exposure to product liability claims for items manufactured by the
transferor. Of course, federal statutes may preempt this statute in certain
areas of liability.
Id.
24. 685 F. Supp. 203 (D. Minn. 1988).
25. Id. at 207.
26. 356 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
1990]
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sylvania's product-line rule.27 As Standal did not determine which
state followed the "best rule of law," Minnesota's position on the
product line exception remained unclear2S until the ruling of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp..29
NIccuM v. HYDRA TOOL CORP.
In 1985, Michael Niccum lost part of his right hand at work while
operating a press brake.30 Upon learning that the original manufac-
turer of the press brake had gone out of business, Niccum brought
suit against Hydra Tool Corporation.3'
The press brake that injured Niccum had been designed by the
Wisconsin Machine Corporation (WMC).32 In February 1973, WMC
sold the press brake design and patent to the Wisconsin Equipment
Corporation (WEC).33 In May 1973, WEC manufactured and sold
the press brake, which ultimately injured Niccum, to Alloy Hard Fac-
ing & Engineering Co.34 Exactly who owned and operated the
machine after Alloy is unknown, but it was later purchased by Nic-
cum's employer, A & D Fabricating Co.3 5 Following the manufac-
ture and sale of the press brake, WEC was acquired by HTC, Inc., a
subsidiary of Hydra Tool Corporation.36 HTC, Inc. and WEC
27. Id. at 383. In Standal, a Minnesota construction worker brought a products
liability action against a Pennsylvania manufacturer for injuries sustained from expo-
sure to asbestos insulation made by the manufacturer's predecessor. After discussing
the technical aspects of choice of law analysis, the court noted that application of
Pennsylvania law would further predictability and "further Minnesota's interest in
providing compensation for resident tort victims." Id. at 382-83.
For a critique of Standal see Comment, Choice-of-Law in Minnesota Corporate Succes-
sor Products Liability: Which Rule is the "Better Rule"?, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 392-409
(1985).
28. Standal, 356 N.W.2d at 382. In a recent federal district court decision, Judge
Murphy commented that "[in Standal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently dis-
tinguished Minnesota's 'traditional test of corporate successor liability' from the
product line rule without expressing any indication that the latter should be
adopted." Everest v. American Transp. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 203, 207 (D. Minn.
1988).
29. 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989).
30. Id. at 97.
31. Id. at 96-97. Hydra Tool Corporation was the corporate successor to the
original manufacturer. The suit was filed on December 5, 1986.
32. Id.
33. Id. WMC dissolved soon afterward in December 1973.
34. Id. Alloy was located in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 98. HTC, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Hydra Tool Corporation,
was created in 1977 for the sole purpose of purchasing WEC. Appellant's Brief at 5,
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989). WEC was acquired by
HTC, Inc. on July 22, 1977. Id. HTC's officers were nearly identical to those of
Hydra Tool. Id. at 6. Prior to the acquisition, the newly incorporated Hydra Tool
Corporation had no experience in product manufacturing. Its sole activity was the
[Vol. 16
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signed a purchase agreement on July 22, 1977.37
The parties expressly provided in the purchase agreement that
HTC, Inc. "would assume no liability for injuries caused by WEC
products already on the market."38 WEC explicitly agreed to retain
any "unknown" liability.39 However, immediately after the sale,
WEC dissolved.40
In 1986, Michael Niccum filed a complaint against Hydra Tool
Corporation seeking damages for the injury to his right hand.41 Hy-
dra Tool moved for summary judgment, arguing that as a corporate
successor to the manufacturer of the press brake it was not liable for
injuries caused by a predecessor's product.42 The trial court granted
Hydra Tool's motion for summary judgment, after concluding that
Minnesota does not recognize a "mere continuation" or "product
line" exception to the general limitation on corporate successor
preparation of a factory to begin the manufacture of hydraulic press brakes, sheers
and presses. Actual manufacturing commenced with the asset shift from WEC via
HTC in early 1978. Id.
37. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 98. The purchase agreement contemplated a cash
sale involving virtually all WEC assets, including the land, building, inventory, con-
tracts, customer lists, accounts receivable, patents, trademarks, and "goodwill." Id.
Files and servicing records on each machine sold by WEC, including a file on the
machine at issue, were also part of the transfer. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The officers of WEC executed a Statement of Intent to Dissolve concur-
rent with the closing of the sale. Appellant's Brief at 6, Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp.,
438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989). Filing and recording of the dissolution statement was
completed October 3, 1977, resulting in WEC being legally dissolved on that date.
Id. No provisions were made by either party to the transaction for any type of bond
to cover "unknown" liability. Id. Respondent clarified in its brief that:
under the terms of the purchase agreement, WEC had the option of dissolv-
ing after the execution of the purchase agreement. However, Hydra Tool
Corporation had no knowledge of whether WEC would dissolve following
the transaction.... Moreover, even though WEC did dissolve in 1977, Hy-
dra Tool Corporation was not aware of the dissolution.
Respondent's Brief at 1, Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989)
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
HTC, Inc. continued to manufacture press brakes of the WEC design at the
WEC plant in Wisconsin for three months after the sale. See Appellant's Brief at 6.
During those three months, HTC manufactured approximately sixteen machines and
marketed them under the Hydra Tool name. Id. HTC then dissolved and its assets
were acquired by Hydra Tool as contemplated by the purchase agreement. Id. Hy-
dra Tool subsequently moved its production operations to Greenwood, Mississippi,
and manufactured mechanical press brakes there for approximately one year. Niccum,
438 N.W.2d at 98.
41. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 97. Plaintiff's complaint was filed on December 5,
1986.
42. Id. In response, plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on
the issue of successor liability. Plaintiff also introduced a motion to amend his com-
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liability.43
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the intent of
the legislature "to limit any further extension of successor liability
beyond the traditional exceptions already provided in JF. Ander-
son." 44 Accordingly, the court reaffirmed the traditional limitations
on successor liability and refused to accept either the expanded mere
continuation exception or the product line exception.45
In rejecting the mere continuation exception, the court was per-
suaded by arguments emphasizing that the successor corporation
had not placed the defective product on the market, had received
little, if any, profit from the product and had not represented the
safety of its predecessor's product to the public.46
With respect to the product line exception, the supreme court
agreed with those courts which have dismissed it as "inconsistent
with elementary products liability principles."4 7 The court agreed
that the exception "threatens small successor businesses with eco-
nomic annihilation because of the difficulty involved in obtaining in-
surance for defects in a predecessor's product .... "48 As a result,
the court concluded that such a "radical change" in the principles of
corporate law was better.left to the legislature.49
In addition, the court rejected Niccum's argument that Hodder v.
43. Id. Further, the court held that under Minnesota law there is no direct cause
of action against a successor corporation for failure to warn users of defects in a
predecessor corporation's product. Id.
44. Id. at 99.
45. Id. at 99-100.
46. See id. at 99. In rejecting the expansion of the mere continuation theory, the
court held toJF. Anderson's narrow interpretation of the third traditional exception.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a statement of the four exceptions. The
supreme court in.F. Anderson stated that the third or "mere continuation" exception
"refers principally to a 'reorganization' of the original corporation, such as is accom-
plished occasionally under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 501 to
676, and perhaps under other state statutory devices." J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v.
Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 38, 206 N.W.2d 365, 369 (1973) (citing 15 W. FLETCHER, supra
note 6, at §§ 7122, 7200). The court inJ.F. Anderson also observed that "[t]he merefact
that a purchasing corporation is 'carrying on the same business'as the selling corporation is not
sufficient to make the purchasing corporation liable for the debts of the selling corporation." Id. at
38-39, 206 N.W.2d at 369 (emphasis supplied).
47. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99-100 n.2. The court further noted that the excep-
tion is particularly inconsistent with strict liability principles since it imposes liability
without a corresponding duty. Id. at 100.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Note, Imposing Strict Liability Upon a Successor Corporation for the Defec-
tive Products of Its Corporate Predecessor: Proposed Alternatives to the Product Line Theory of
Liability, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1397, 1416-17 n.155 (1982). See generally Green, Successor
Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 COR-
NELL L. REV. 17 (1986).
[Vol. 16
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss2/7
SUCCESSOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 50 created an independent duty for succes-
sor corporations "to warn of a defective, unreasonably dangerous
product."5' The court stated that the duty to warn in Hodder was
imposed upon subsidiary corporations, not successor corporations.52
Consequently, the court considered whether the facts of the casejus-
tified the imposition of a duty to warn on successor corporations.53
As Hydra did not service any of the press brakes manufactured by
WEC and neither knew of any defects in the product nor the location
of the machine at the time Niccum was injured, the court concluded
that Hydra had no duty to warn. 54
ANALYSIS
While the supreme court's decision in Niccum is consistent with the
Minnesota Business Corporations Act, it nonetheless produces harsh
results for plaintiffs in successor liability cases. 5 5 Such plaintiffs ap-
pear doubly disadvantaged as their injuries tend to be more severe
than those suffered in products liability cases 56 and their remedies
50. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988).
51. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 100.
52. Id. The court distinguished the present case from Hodder after finding that
the two cases dealt with "different issues." Id. "Hodder involved the manufacture of
defective tire rims (K-rims) by Goodyear. Motor Wheel Corporation was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Goodyear and handled the marketing of the K-rim, although it
was not involved in their manufacture." Id. The court found that "Hodder differs
from the present matter because Motor Wheel was a subsidiary of the manufacturer,
Goodyear, while Hydra Tool is merely a successor to Wisconsin Equipment Corpora-
tion." Id. The court noted that it had "specifically limited the duty to warn imposed
in Hodder to the facts of that case involving a subsidiary corporation." Id.
53. The court used the test set out in Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th
Cir. 1977) to determine whether Hydra Tool had incurred a duty to warn. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested in Travis that in
determining whether a duty to warn should be imposed on a successor corporation:
Succession to a predecessor's service contracts, coverage of the particular
machine under a service contract, service of that machine by the purchaser
corporation, a purchaser corporation's knowledge of defects and of the loca-
tion or owner of that machine, are factors which may be considered in deter-
mining the presence of a nexus or relationship effective to create a duty to
warn.
Id. at 449.
54. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 100-01. The court also noted that Hydra Tool
neither succeeded to any of WEC's service contracts nor used the customer lists sup-
plied by WEC. Id.
55. While Minnesota plaintiffs may still recover under Standal choice of law cases,
this fact is of little comfort since few states have adopted either the mere continuation
or the product line exceptions. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
56. See Green, supra note 49, at 19 (citing INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT
LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81
(1977)). There is some evidence suggesting that "injuries suffered by plaintiffs in
successor liability cases tend to be more serious than those suffered in all product
liability cases." Id. According to the insurance survey cited by Green, "[a]s the time
1990]
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more limited than commercial creditors.57 This situation is unac-
ceptable and in need of redress.
While a variety of remedies have been proposed,58 debate has cen-
tered on the merits ofjudicial versus legislative reform.59 Advocates
for judicial reform support the expanded successor liability rules of
Ray and Turner which hold successor corporations liable for plain-
tiff's injuries.60 In contrast, advocates of legislative reform seek to
hold the predecessor liable by. revising corporate continuance stat-
utes to extend the predecessor's existence for litigation purposes be-
yond dissolution. 6'
from manufacture to injury increases, the amount paid also tends to increase." Id. at
19 n. 11. Thus, although 2.8% of injured parties make claims that involve at least a
10-year gap from manufacture to injury, they receive 6.6% of the total payments. Id.
57. See Green, supra note 49, at 19-20 n.16. Green lists seven different remedies
which provide protection for creditors of a corporation reorganizing or transferring
its assets.
58. Indemnity agreements, escrow accounts and liability insurance are the most
frequently discussed remedies. See, e.g., Note, The Post-Dissolution Products Liability
Claim Problem: A Statutory Versus a Judicial Solution, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1279, 1309 &
n.177 (1987). The commentator points out:
Under an escrow account scheme, the transferee would negotiate with the
transferor to have part of the proceeds from the asset purchase put in an
escrow account with a neutral party.... [On the other hand, an] indemnity
provision would require the transferor to compensate the transferee for any
liability it incurs as a result of the transferor's defective products.
Id. at 1309. Indemnity agreements may either be open-ended or provide for a fixed
ceiling. Id. at 1309 n.179.
Greater use of product liability insurance by successor corporations is another
suggested means of providing compensation for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Note, Products
Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer
Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000,
1023-24 (1980). One commentator would couple an insurance requirement with a
statute of repose. See Note, supra note 49, at 1432-37. At least one court has recom-
mended that the state legislature consider such a statute. See Kozlowski v. John E.
Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 892-94, 275 N.W.2d 915, 924-25 (1979); see also
Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault Upon the Citadel of Strict Lia-
bility, 23 S.D.L. REV. 149, 177-79 (1978).
59. One commentator endorsed the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporations
Act over two judicial approaches to the post-dissolution products liability problem.
See Note, The Post-Dissolution Products Liability Claim Problem: A Statutory Versus a Judicial
Solution, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1279, 1315 (1987). Another commentator criticizes the
RMBCA and proposes an original model statute. See Green, supra note 49, at 49-58.
Other commentators favor a statutory solution similar to a products liability statute
of repose. See Aylward & Aylward, Successor Liability for Defective Products-Misplaced
Responsibility, 13 STETSON L. REV. 555, 587-89 (1984).
60. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
61. See Note, supra note 59, at 1290. "At common law, a dissolved corporation
could not be sued, and all causes of action against it abated." Id. To ameliorate this
harsh result, states enacted corporate continuance statutes to continue the existence
of a dissolved corporation for certain purposes. Id. Under corporate continuance
statutes, designated claims are said to "survive" the corporation's dissolution and are
able to be brought against the dissolved corporation during the post-dissolution pe-
[Vol. 16
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The solution proposed by each side is derived from their own par-
ticular view of the problem. Advocates for judicial reform view the
issue as one of compensation. They contend plaintiffs are left with-
out a remedy because product liability claims mature late and occur
in a highly fluid market in which corporate acquisitions are often
structured so as to avoid liability. Given the capacity of the successor
corporation to serve as an effective substitute for compensation pur-
poses, advocates for judicial reform favor modification of the tradi-
tional corporate rule to expand successor liability.62
Advocates for legislative reform, on the other hand, view the issue
as one of causation.63 They contend that since the predecessor
placed the defective product on the market, the predecessor rather
than its corporate successor must be held liable for any resulting in-
juries.64 The chief obstacle to this solution is potential dissolution of
the predecessor65 coupled with permissive state dissolution and liq-
uidation statutes which allow corporations to avoid any obligation
for products liability injuries.66
The argument for judicial reform is unpersuasive. Both the mere
continuation exception and the product line exception expand suc-
cessor corporate liability in violation of strict liability theory.67 Tra-
riod. Id. Advocates of the legislative approach support the use of this concept to
make the predecessor corporation liable for products liability claims after dissolu-
tion. Id. In order to facilitate compensation, the legislative approach requires corpo-
rations seeking to dissolve to set aside funds for post-dissolution products liability
claims.
62. See Green, supra note 49, at 28-40 (an excellent discussion of eight justifica-
tions for imposing liability on a successor corporation).
63. Green, for example, states that "[an initial assessment of the appropriate
loss bearer in the successor context points toward imposing liability on the entity
responsible for the defective product that caused the injury-the predecessor." Id. at
27.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 32. Green asserts that "the core of the successor liability problem...
[is] the dissolution and liquidation of the predecessor." Id.
66. See Note, supra note 59, at 1284-85 ("[T]he non-assumption rule deprives the
products liability claimant of an opportunity to recover against those who purchased
the assets of manufacturers that produce defective products, while many ... [state
dissolution and liquidation] statutes deprive the same claimant of any recovery
against the dissolved original manufacturer.")
67. Numerous courts and commentators take this position. See, e.g., Domine v.
Fulton Iron Works, 76 II1. App. 3d 253, 257, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979)
(corporate successor "is clearly outside the original producing and marketing
chain"); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D.
1984) (since successor did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly defective
product, to impose liability without a corresponding duty would remove strict liabil-
ity from the realm of tort); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 308, 479
A.2d 126, 127 (1984) (successor corporation did not create risk).
The strongest argument on this point is presented in Griggs v. Capitol Machine
Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ of error refused, 701 S.W.2d
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ditionally, under strict liability theory only members of the original
marketing chain are held liable for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts. 68 But, the successor corporation is not part of the original mar-
keting chain, having neither manufactured the defective product nor
profited from its sale. Since the successor did not create the risk of
harm, place the product in the stream of commerce, or represent or
warrant its safety, it seems anomalous to hold it liable for any result-
ing injuries.69
To impose liability on an entity that has not contributed to an in-
jury simply to provide a remedy for a plaintiff is unjust from the
standpoint of corporate, property and products liability law. 7O Fur-
238 (Tex. 1985). In Griggs, the court relied on the express language of section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to discount expansion of successor liability.
The court emphasized that "the theory of the section is to make one who sells a product
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer or user." Id.
at 292 (emphasis in original). The court further noted that causation arises out of
" 'circumstances and events preceding a plaintiff's injury as are within the defendant's
exclusive ability to control.' " Id. (emphasis in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 5 comment a (1965)). The court reasoned that this limitation prevented
the imposition of strict liability upon a successor under the product line theory. The
rationale of the product line theory "assuredly cannot find a juridical basis in the the-
ory of products-liability ... for that theory ... and the underlying 'social policies[ ]'
expressly disclaim imposing a duty upon one who has no ability to control the circum-
stances and events which preceded a specific plaintiff's injury." Id. (emphasis in
original).
68. See Sell, supra note 4, at 81. Sell notes that prior to Ray "[aIll of the previous
products liability cases had one crucial fact in common: the party held liable either
manufactured or distributed the defective product." Id.
69. Id. Sell comments: "This results in an entity that had no control over the
manufacture or distribution of the defective product answering for the injury thereby
caused. One can reasonably question the fairness or justice of such result." Id. at 81.
70. From a corporate law perspective, requiring a successor corporation to com-
pensate an injured plaintiff for damage caused by a predecessor's product imposes an
unfair penalty on the successor which could not be foreseen at the time the acquisi-
tion was consummated. See Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817,
820-21 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). Such liability is especially unfair to the successor corpo-
ration's customers who must bear not only the successor's costs but also those of the
original manufacturer. Id.
Holding a successor corporation liable for an injury caused by a predecessor's
product is also unjust under property law where the successor's position has fre-
quently been likened to that of the bona fide purchaser. The bona fide purchaser
rule holds that a good faith purchaser, who is without notice of prior claims on the
property and pays adequate consideration, will not be held liable for any prior or
contingent claims related to that property. See Sell, supra note 4, at 81. For a discus-
sion of the bona fide purchaser doctrine regarding real property sales, see J. CRIB-
BETr & C. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 227-28 (3d ed. 1989). For
a good analysis of the bona fide purchaser rule as related to successor liability, see
Yamin, supra note 6, at 206-14. For a discussion on the differences between the bona
fide purchaser situation and the successor products liability issue, see Note, supra
note 5, at 685 & n.59.
From a products liability perspective, imposing liability on the successor which
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ther, extending successor corporate liability in such cases would pro-
duce inconsistent results. 7 ' Some corporate successors would be
held liable, while others would escape liability only because of the
subsequent history of the predecessor corporation. 72 Even if this
were not so, however, extending liability to successor corporations is
not likely to facilitate the goal of plaintiff compensation because of
potential chilling effects on corporate transfers. 73
Judicial extension of successor products liability would have a de-
pressing effect on corporate acquisitions as it "makes it almost im-
possible . . . to determine an accurate purchase price for the
corporation being acquired."74 Small businesses, in particular,
would be negatively affected. 75 Under such conditions, business
played no role in the manufacture of the defective product is as unjust as imposing
liability on a competitor of the original producer. See Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 820.
Thelcourt noted in Woody that entire industries are not held liable in products liability
cases because manufacturers are held responsible only for their own actions, includ-
ing the level of safety they have selected. Id. at 820-21. Thus a corporate stranger
which purchases the predecessor's assets should not be held responsible for the
predecessor's defective products since it had no ability at the time the product was
manufactured to improve its safety. Id. at 821.
71. See Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 821.
72. See Note, supra note 49, at 1427. Drawing upon Woody, the commentator
notes that "[i]f the predecessor does not dissolve, the successor will escape liability.
If prior to dissolution the predecessor decides to sell its assets to various purchasers
so that no single purchaser continues to manufacture the product line of the prede-
cessor, there will be no 'successor,' and no recoery at all is possible." Id. at 1427
(citing Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978)).
73. See Note, supra note 59, at 1307-11. The commentator also notes that the
extent of a plaintiff's compensation under the Ray and Turner tests depends upon
how consistently the courts construe these rather technical tests. As a result, he ob-
serves that expanded successor liability tests may "leave products liability claimants
as remediless as did the non-assumption rule of successor corporations which they
supplanted." Id. at 1301. For a discussion of how the courts have construed the Ray
and Turner tests, see id. at 1301-07.
74. Sell, supra note 4, at 79. Sell states that the purchase price must be deter-
mined by "some educated guess on the liability expenses that will arise from defec-
tive products that may have been manufactured by the predecessor." Id. at 80.
Empirical evidence suggests that expansion of successor corporate liability may
have a devastating effect in Minnesota. Expanded successor liability rules have a de-
pressing effect on asset transfers. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. In 1984,
Minnesota corporations were involved in a record number of corporate mergers,
consolidations and other forms of division, product line and asset acquisition. See
Novak, Additions to the Preyroll, 16 CORP. REP. MINN. 37, 37 (Feb. 1985). Novak reports
a "record-shattering" 321 transactions in 1984 involving Minnesota companies, up
269% over the 87 transactions which took place in 1979. "As in each of the previous
five years, Minnesota firms were net acquirers, not sellers, of companies and assets."
Id. Expansion of successor corporate liability would potentially reduce the number
of transactions taking place in Minnesota.
75. See Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the Product User
and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1000, 1000-04 (1980). Because of their limited assets, "[simall
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transfers could easily become "traps for the unwary"76 where an ac-
quiring corporation pays a substantial sum only to acquire the "po-
tentially enormous" unknown products liability of its predecessor. 77
By endangering the financial viability of the acquiring corporation,
successor liability proposals could cripple the very class of defend-
ants upon which plaintiffs' compensation depends.78 Corporations
concerned about successor liability may refrain from making asset
transfers altogether, 79 thereby forcing corporations seeking to dis-
solve to liquidate their assets.80 Consequently, no corporate succes-
sor would be left for an injured plaintiff to sue.81
Successor liability proposals ultimately force the courts to choose
between two innocent parties. 82 To hold for the plaintiff, the court
must hold a good faith corporate purchaser liable. To hold for the
successor, the court must leave an innocent plaintiff without any
practical remedy. To untie this Gordian knot requires society to rec-
ognize the false dichotomy presented by either of these options and
to search for other alternatives.
In contrast to judicial reform, legislative reform proposals are con-
corporations are more threatened than larger corporations by potential liability for
injuries caused by a predecessor's product." Id. at 1002. "Personal injuries fre-
quently give rise to hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages." Id. at 1002 n. 11.
Thus, small businesses are truly faced with "economic annihilation" where a prede-
cessor's product produces multiple lawsuits. Id. at 1002. In 1980, "small manufac-
turing corporations compris[ed] ninety percent of the nation's manufacturing
enterprises." Id. at 1003.
76. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
One of the considerations which led to the rejection of the product line exception in
Woody was that the court did not want to see ordinary business transfers become
"traps for unwary successor corporations." Id.; see also Sell, supra note 4, at 80.
77. Sell, supra note 4, at 80.
78. See id.; Note, supra note 59, at 1306-07. A commentator has made a different
but nonetheless fascinating point. While examining the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Ramirez the commentator asserts the seemingly outlandish propo-
sition that extending the scope of products liability laws to assure successor liability
will ultimately benefit manufacturers and insurers, not consumers. Note, Product Lia-
bility Lau-Successor Corporation May Be Held Strictly Liable for Injuries Caused by Product
Manufactured by Predecessor Corporation if Successor Has Continued Manufacturing Same Prod-
uct Line as Predecessor-Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811
(1981), 55 TEMP. L.Q. 263, 290 (1982). The commentator asserts that this result is
likely because Ramirez and related decisions diminish the incentive for safety which is
implicit in products liability law. Id. Instead, successor corporations are encouraged
to raise prices in order to cover the costs of insurance and litigation awards. Id.
Consumers must then bear higher prices, more dangerous products, and "an in-
creased tendency to view product liability laws as purely compensatory in purpose."
Id.
79. Note, supra note 59, at 1306; see also Sell, supra note 4, at 80.
80. Note, supra note 59, at 1306.
81. Id.
82. See Aylward & Aylward, supra note 59, at 582.
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sistent with strict tort liability, solidly grounded in causation theory
and fair, because they provide plaintiffs with a remedy obtained
against the entity at fault-the predecessor corporation. Since the
predecessor manufactured the defective product and placed it in the
stream of commerce, the predecessor should bear the responsibility
of compensating injured plaintiffs.83 However, in Minnesota and
many other states, a predecessor may escape liability through per-
missive corporate dissolution and liquidation statutes. By implicitly
sanctioning such corporate disappearing acts, these statutes leave
plaintiffs with only the successor to sue. Indeed, the absence of the
predecessor "has compelled the courts to expand the exceptions to
the corporate law rule." 84 A superior approach would be to change
present law to require the predecessor to provide compensation for
potential future injured plaintiffs prior to dissolution.
PREDECESSOR LIABILITY THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Two recent legislative reform proposals would allow a plaintiff's
products liability claim to survive the dissolution of the predecessor
corporation.8 5 Both the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporations
Act (RMBCA) and a prototype dissolution-restricting statute advo-
cated by University of Iowa Professor Michael Green would achieve
this objective. 86
As Green states, "[u]ntil its revision in 1984, the Model Business
Corporation Act made no provision for claims arising after dissolu-
tion and imposed a two year limitation on pre-dissolution claims."
8 7
In recognition of the problems faced by products liability plaintiffs
and other long-tail claimants, the drafters of the 1984 RMBCA modi-
fied the Act to allow post-dissolution claims against a dissolved cor-
poration.88 The 1984 version achieves this goal by extending the
limitations period on claims against dissolved corporations to five
years. 89 The extension of the limitations period virtually eliminates
the distinction between pre- and post-dissolution claims.90
Under the RMBCA approach, "dissolution does not terminate the
83. Id.
84. Id. at 583.
85. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.07 (1984); Green, supra note
49, at 49-58.
86. See RMBCA § 14.07; Green, supra note 49, at 49-50.
87. Green, supra note 49, at 49. To support his position, Green refers to the
1979 version of the Model Business Corp. Act § 105. Id. at 49 n.144.
88. See RMBCA § 14.06-.07.
89. See RMBCA § 14.07(c). Green suggests the five year extension does not re-
ally solve the problem. Green, supra note 49, at 49.
90. See RMBCA § 14.06 official comment (1984). The comment provides in
part:
Sections 14.06 and 14.07 provide a new and simplified system for handling
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corporate existence . . . ."91 Rather, it initiates the process of wind-
ing up the corporation's affairs, including liquidation of its assets and
discharge of its liabilities.9 2 Claims against dissolved corporations
are of two types, known and unknown.93 Known claims from con-
ventional creditors can be readily discharged. 9 4 Unknown claims,95
which frequently include products liability claims, may be enforced
against the dissolved corporation in one of two ways. 9 6 If the dis-
solved corporation retains any undistributed assets, a claim may be
brought against it.97 If all assets have been liquidated, a claimant
may, with limitations, bring an action against former shareholders.98
Dissolved corporations and their shareholders remain open to suit
for all claims under the RMBCA for five years after publication of the
dissolution notice. 99 Thereafter, all claims are barred.100
Green's proposed alternative, while compatible with the
RMBCA,1O1 is more specifically targeted to products liability plain-
known and unknown claims against a dissolved corporation, including
claims based on events that occur after the dissolution of the corporation.
See also Green, supra note 49, at 49.
91. RMBCA § 14.05 official comment.
92. See id.
93. See RMBCA § 14.06 (governing known claims against dissolved corporation)
and § 14.07 (governing unknown claims against dissolved corporation).
94. See RMBCA § 14.06 and official comment. These claims are "known" in the
sense that the corporation has knowledge of them at the time of dissolution. The
comment adds that a claim may be known even if unliquidated.
95. See RMBCA § 14.07(c) and § 14.06 (official comment). Unknown claims are
recognizable by the fact that they are based on events that occur after the dissolution
of the corporation. Accordingly, because such claims mature after dissolution, the
corporation is said to be without "knowledge" of them.
96. See RMBCA § 14.07(d).
97. See RMBCA § 14.07(d)(1). Whether a dissolving corporation must set aside
funds for unknown or contingent claims prior to liquidating and distributing corpo-
rate assets is unclear. Section 14.05(a)(3) generally requires a dissolved corporation
to "discharg[e] or make provision for discharging its liabilities." While this language
could be liberally construed to encompass contingent claims, the comments appear
to suggest otherwise. Specifically, the comment to § 14.06 provides that:
Even though the directors are not trustees of the assets of a dissolved corpo-
ration ... , they must discharge or make provision for discharging all of the
corporation's known liabilities before distributing the remaining assets to the
shareholders.
This construction seems most in line with the statute's intent, since it does not other-
wise preclude the corporation from dissolving or from distributing its assets until the
end of the five year liability period for unknown claims.
98. See RMBCA § 14.07(d)(2).
99. See RMBCA § 14.07(c).
100. Id.
101. See Green, supra note 49, at 50 n.151. Green notes that, as drafted, his model
"statute can easily be incorporated into the Model Business Corporation Act or a
similar statute." Id. Under his model, §§ 14.06 and 14.07 of the Model Business
Corporations Act would be preempted. Id.
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tiffs and manufacturers.102 Green's approach precludes a manufac-
turing corporation from dissolving or distributing its assets to
shareholders "until [it] has made adequate provision for postdissolu-
tion [sic] products liability claims."' 03
Under Green's proposal, a manufacturer seeking to dissolve may
provide for post-dissolution products liability claims in any of three
different ways. A manufacturer may: (1) purchase products liability
insurance; (2) transfer "liability for future products liability claims to
the purchaser of the corporation's assets;" or (3) use any other
method that protects "those asserting postdissolution [sic] products
liability claims."104 To make "adequate" provision for post-dissolu-
tion products liability claims, a manufacturer's insurance coverage or
other assets must be equal to or greater than the corporation's net
current value at the time of dissolution, including "the value of any
prior distributions made to shareholders in contemplation of
dissolution." 105
In certain limited circumstances, Green's proposal allows a dis-
solving corporation to seek judicial modification of its obligation to
provide for post-dissolution products liability claims.106 However,
Green would penalize any corporate officer or director for recom-
mending, voting for, or assenting to a distribution or dissolution
which fails to conform to the requirements discussed above, or which
is otherwise in bad faith.107 Such officers and directors would be
deemed to have violated their fiduciary responsibilities to the corpo-
ration and would be "personally liable to any postdisolution [sic]
products liability claimant to the same extent that the corporation
would have been liable had it not dissolved."108
Finally, Green's model statute expressly provides that an acquiring
corporation is not liable for claims relating to products manufac-
tured or sold by its predecessor prior to acquisition unless it explic-
102. RMBCA § 14.05(b)(5) allows strict liability claims, tort claims, as well as all
other types of claims against a dissolved corporation. Green's proposed statute, on
the other hand, strictly limits itself to providing a remedy for post-dissolution prod-
ucts liability claimants. See Green, supra note 49, at 50. Green defines a "postdissolu-
tion products liability claim" as "any claim for damages arising out of the
manufacture, sale, or lease of a product by a corporation that is based at least in part
on events occurring after the effective date of the corporation's dissolution." Id. As
Green notes, his statute is "tailored to affect only manufacturers and component part
manufacturers .... Id. at 55. Green maintains that limiting the statute to these
defendants "avoids the undesirable effect of casting too wide a net and placing un-
necessary restrictions on dissolution." Id.
103. See id. at 50-51.
104. See id. at 51.
105. See id. at 51-52.
106. See id. at 52-53.
107. See id. at 53-54, 57.
108. See id. at 53-54.
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itly agreed to accept such liability.109
Both the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporations Act and
Green's model statute are superior to judicial reform proposals con-
tained in such decisions as Ray and Turner. Both the RMBCA and
Green's model statute are consistent with strict liability theory be-
cause they impose liability on the entity which introduced the defec-
tive product into the stream of commerce." 0 Both proposals
recognize post-dissolution products liability plaintiffs as legitimate
corporate creditors."' Moreover, meritorious claimants under
either approach gain a statutory remedy which survives corporate
dissolution and is more certain than the judicial approach. 112 Most
importantly, however, this remedy is fair because it is obtained
against the entity at fault: the predecessor corporation."i 3 By hold-
ing the original producer of the defective product liable, manufactur-
ers are encouraged to make safer products, thus deterring negligent
behavior. 114
Beyond benefiting products liability claimants, both the RMBCA
and Green's proposal attempt to preserve the corporate law goal of
facilitating asset transfers.' "5 Under either approach, successor lia-
bility does not attach unless the acquiring corporation voluntarily as-
sumes it as part of the asset transfer.116 As a result, most asset
109. See id. at 54-55.
110. See Aylward & Aylward, supra note 59, at 582; see also Sell, supra note 4, at 81.
Both proposals impliedly or expressly impose liability on the predecessor corpora-
tion. Such liability is implied under RMBCA 14.07(c) whereas it is explicit in Green's
proposal. See Green, supra note 49, at 54-55.
111. See RMBCA § 14.07(c); Green, supra note 49, at 50-51.
112. See Note, supra note 49, at 1427 (pointing out the likelihood of inconsistent
results under the product line approach). Both § 14.07 of the RMBCA and Green's
model statute are likely to be more certain as neither approach depends upon the
willingness of the successor corporation to assume the predecessor's liability.
113. See Aylward & Aylward, supra note 59, at 582.
114. See Note, supra note 59, at 1315.
115. Under the RMBCA, the claims of injured products liability claimants are al-
lowed to survive corporate dissolution for a five year period. But the corporation
need not "provide for" such claims at dissolution by holding up liquidation or distri-
bution of corporate assets or by delaying dissolution in anticipation of such claims.
See supra note 97.
Under Green's approach, post-dissolution products liability claimants receive
the certainty that claims are provided for prior to corporate dissolution or asset dis-
tribution. See Green, supra note 49, at 50-51. A successor corporation receives statu-
tory assurances that the acquisition of assets from a predecessor corporation does
not subject it to liability for claims relating to products manufactured or sold by the
predecessor prior to the acquisition. Id.
116. See Note, supra note 59, at 1312. The commentator states:
"A transferee under the section 14.07 survival of remedy provision ...
would only incur successor liability when the asset transfer is incidental to
the transferor's dissolution, and the transferee agrees to assume liability."
Id. (citing RMBCA § 14 .05(a)(3)). Green states that his "statute unequivocally im-
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transfers probably would not give rise to successor liability.17 Be-
cause both model statutes hold the predecessor responsible for any
unknown products liability, would-be corporate successors will have
fewer concerns about acquiring predecessor's assets.
Neither the RMBCA nor Green's proposal, however, is capable of
solving all of the problems which arise in successor liability cases.
For example, an injured plaintiff is still left without a remedy under
either approach when the dissolving predecessor is an unincorpo-
rated manufacturer which operated as a sole proprietorship or as a
partnership.'18 Further, each approach has its own shortcomings.
The major problem with the RMBCA approach is its method of
claim enforcement.1l9 To the extent that a corporation is not re-
quired to "provide" for unknown claims at dissolution,20 the likeli-
hood of recovery by claimants narrows considerably. While
claimants may pursue claims against undistributed corporate as-
sets,1 21 it is unlikely that any assets will remain. Dissolving corpora-
tions will have every incentive to liquidate and distribute corporate
assets before further claims become "known." As a result, a claim-
ant's only remaining remedy is to sue the shareholders of the dis-
solved corporation.122 Obstacles to compensation under this option
are legion since recovery depends upon a claimant's ability to find
and join enough shareholders to make the effort worthwhile.123
Green's proposal, while specifically tailored to provide products
liability plaintiffs with a remedy, does not explain why this class of
plaintiffs merits special compensation.t 24 Further, while Green seeks
to guarantee compensation to meritorious claimants, any recovery is
made tenuous at best given the probable negative effects of his pro-
posal on corporate asset transfers.125 Green's plan contemplates
that in many asset sales, the successor will assume the predecessor's
poses liability on the predecessor unless the successor expressly agrees to assume the
predecessor's liability." See Green, supra note 49, at 55.
117. See Note, supra note 59, at 1312.
118. See Green, supra note 49, at 58 n.166.
119. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 95.
121. See RMBCA § 14.07(d)(1).
122. See RMBCA § 14.07(d)(2).
123. While the task of identifying and locating former shareholders and tracing
their share of the dissolved corporation's assets is difficult enough where there are
few shareholders, it may be impossible where numerous shareholders are involved.
Moreover, RMBCA § 14.07(d)(2) limits the liability of individual shareholders even
in cases where they can be found.
124. Professor Michael Steenson of William Mitchell College of Law is strongly
critical of such proposals on this account and his concerns are echoed in the dissent
in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 431-61, 244 N.W.2d 873,
884-98 (1976).
125. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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liabilities as a term of the acquisition.126 But where the predeces-
sor's unknown liability may be substantial, it will be difficult for the
parties to agree on a purchase price. If so, the outstanding liability
may deter the would-be purchaser altogether.12 7 This problem is ex-
acerbated under Green's approach since he provides no statute of
limitations period to limit a predecessor's liability. Instead, liability
is open-ended for both the predecessor and any potential corporate
successor. As previously noted, such chilling effects on corporate
transfers could have an equally chilling effect on plaintiff
compensation. 128
MINNESOTA SHOULD ADOPT THE RMBCA APPROACH
Given a choice between the two legislative proposals, Minnesota
should follow the 1984 RMBCA approach. Compared to Green's
proposal, the RMBCA represents the better compromise between
the injured plaintiff's need for compensation and a corporation's le-
gitimate need for certainty and predictability during the dissolution
process.
Clearly, the RMBCA approach has many advantages. While pro-
viding a remedy for products liability plaintiffs, the RMBCA makes
no distinction between the post-dissolution claims of these plaintiffs
and other tort or non-tort claimants. 129 Given its more general na-
ture, the RMBCA escapes the special compensation problem evident
in Green's proposal while having the breadth to address other suc-
cessor liability issues.
Also, for reasons already discussed, the RMBCA provides more
protection for legitimate corporate interests.' 30 While post-dissolu-
tion plaintiffs are given a remedy, that remedy is limited. This is ap-
propriate because the number of future injured claimants is not
presently known. In all likelihood, the number of future claimants
may be small. If so, then it would be especially inappropriate to pro-
vide a sweeping remedy of the sort which Green envisions.
Furthermore, the RMBCA's five-year cut-off period for unknown
claims contains benefits for both plaintiffs and dissolving corpora-
tions. Plaintiffs would benefit since research shows that the vast ma-
jority of products liability claims accrue within five years of the
manufacturer's dissolution.I3 In fact, "according to one study, 97.3
percent of all products involved in products liability suits were
126. See Green, supra note 49, at 55.
127. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of other areas in which the successor liability issue has
arisen, see Green, supra note 49, at 58 n. 167.
130. See supra notes 99-100, 127 and accompanying text.
131. See Note, supra note 59, at 1312. Irrespective of whether a legislature found
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purchased within six years of the plaintiff's injury."132 Dissolving
corporations would also benefit under the RMBCA as its five-year
limitation on claims operates, for all practical purposes, as a statute
of repose.1SS
As good as the RMBCA is, however, it should be improved in at
least one significant respect. Section 14.05(a)(3) should be amended
to require that a dissolving corporation "discharge its known liabili-
ties and make provisions for discharging its unknown liabilities prior
to making any distributions to shareholders." The RMBCA should
not prescribe how this is to be done. Rather, corporations should
be allowed to set aside funds for contingent liabilities, purchase
products liability insurance or take other measures as they see fit.134
But to the extent that injured claimants represent legitimate corpo-
rate creditors, their interests should take precedence over those of
the five-year period to be excessive or minimal, it could always adjust the period to
whatever it desired. Id. at 1313-14.
132. Id. at 1312.
133. Scholars and lawyers are paying increased attention to the impact of the time
dimension on products liability theory. See The Passage of Time: The Implications for
Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 733 (1983) (Editor's Introduction); Henderson,
Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAUF. L. REV. 919 (1981). This
increased attention has obvious implications for both parties in successor corpora-
tion products liability suits as cases may involve a long time span between the manu-
facture and sale of an allegedly defective product and the date when the injury
occurs. This time span is often around ten years but may exceed fifty. See, e.g., Lean-
nais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 1977) (9 years); Wright v. Fed.
Mach. Co., 535 F. Supp. 645, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (50 years); Menacho v. Adamson
United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D.NJ. 1976) (53 years); Manh Hung Nguyen v.
Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1143-44, 433 N.E.2d 1104,
1106 (1982) (18 years); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343, 346,
314 N.W.2d 614, 615 (1981) (34 years); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 211
Neb. 724, 725, 320 N.W.2d 481, 482 (1982) (22 years); Tift v. Forage King Indus.,
Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 74, 322 N.W.2d 14, 15 (1982) (13-14 years); Cody v. Sheboy-
gan Mach. Co., 108 Wis. 2d 105, 106-07, 321 N.W.2d 142, 143 (1982) (33 years). An
author points out:
"Many products with long lives, especially capital goods such as presses
used in manufacturing, may cause injuries decades after they are first
sold.... Data from the ISO [Insurance Services Office] closed-claims survey
show that 'some 4% of bodily injury claims, -involving 10% of ultimate pay-
ment dollars, still have not occurred eight years after the date of manufac-
ture' of the machine involved."
The Devils in the Product Liability Laws, BusINESS WEEK, Feb. 12, 1979, at 75 (citation
omitted).
134. See Aylward & Aylward, supra note 59, at 588. The Aylwards observe that
maintaining products liability insurance during the statutory period would benefit
both shareholders and potential claimants. "Continuing the insurance would allow
the corporation to complete its liquidation promptly and alleviate any contingent
liability of the shareholders. In addition, claimants would have access to a fund from




Hunt: Tort Law—Towards a Legislative Solution to the Successor Products
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
shareholders. 1 35
CONCLUSION
Though consistent with the Minnesota Business Corporations Act,
the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Niccum v. Hydra Tool
Corp. 136 produces harsh results for plaintiffs in successor liability
cases. To remedy that problem, both judicial and legislative reme-
dies have been proposed.
Judicial remedies seeking to extend strict liability theory to succes-
sor corporations are unjust, incompatible with traditional products
liability theory, and unlikely to lead to plaintiff compensation be-
cause of their devastating effects on corporate transfers. In contrast,
legislative remedies, such as the 1984 Revised Model Business Cor-
porations Act, justifiably hold predecessor manufacturers liable for
defective products, promote deterrence, and provide injured plain-
tiffs with a needed source of recovery without placing overly burden-
some costs on asset transfers.
Accordingly, the Minnesota legislature should revise the Minne-
sota version of the Business Corporations Act in accordance with the
RMBCA to fashion a limited, but necessary, remedy to meet the le-
gitimate needs of these plaintiffs.137
David B. Hunt
135. As Green has stated, "[t]he law should not allow corporations to cease opera-
tions in a manner that frustrates claims of legitimate creditors." Green, supra note
49, at 59.
136. 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989).
137. Revising the Minnesota Business Corporation Act in accordance with the
1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act would not be difficult. In order to do
so only the following changes would have to be made. First, Minnesota Statutes
§ 302A.551 would be amended to preclude distributions to shareholders until the
dissolved corporation "discharges its known liabilities and makes provisions for dis-
charging its unknown liabilities." A similar amendment may be required under
§ 302A.725, subdivision 3.
Second, Minnesota Statutes § 302A.723 would be revised to parallel the provi-
sions of RMBCA § 14.05, with the proviso that RMBCA § 14.05(a)(3) should be
changed to read: "discharging its known liabilities and making provisions for dis-
charging its unknown liabilities."
Third, Minnesota Statutes § 302A.729 would be retitled as "Known Claims
Against Dissolved Corporation" and rewritten to parallel the provision of RMBCA
§ 14.06.
Fourth, a new section, would be added and entitled "Unknown Claims Against
Dissolved Corporation." The text of this section should parallel that of RMBCA
§ 14.07 which provides for notice requirements to unknown claimants and provides
that such claims will be barred unless the claimant commences a proceeding to en-
force the claim against the dissolved corporation within five years after the publica-
tion of newspaper notice. Most importantly, the section should expressly authorize
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claims by "claimants whose claims are contingent or based on an event occurring
after the effective date of dissolution."
Fifth, Minnesota Statutes § 302A.733, subdivision 1(a) would be amended to
read as follows: "The payment of claims of all known or unknown creditors and
claimants has been made or provided for."
And sixth, Minnesota Statutes § 302A.763, subdivision 1 would be amended to
read as follows: "In an involuntary or supervised voluntary dissolution after the costs
and expenses of the proceedings and all known and unknown debts, obligations, and
liabilities of the corporation have been paid or discharged.., the court shall enter a
decree dissolving the corporation."
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Eighth Circuit Issue
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Photo by Haga Photographv, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Top Row (left to right): Judge Frank J. Magill, Judge Pasco
M. Bowman, Judge George G. Fagg, Judge Roger L. Wollman,
and Judge C. Arlen Beam
Bottom Row: Judge Richard S. Arnold, Judge Gerald W.
Heaney (has taken senior status), Chief Judge Donald P. Lay,
Judge Theodore McMillian, and Judge John R. Gibson.
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